In the case of A, B & C v Ireland the European Court of Human Rights found that there had been an interference with the applicants' right to private life. However, "owing to the acute sensitivity of the moral and ethical issues raised by abortion" Ireland was afforded a wide margin of appreciation and was not found to have breached the Convention. This paper argues that the Court's application of the margin of appreciation doctrine was disproportionate. Firstly, the existence of 'consensus' throughout Europe on permitting abortions where a woman's health and wellbeing are at risk should have contracted the power of discretion afforded to national authorities. Secondly, the blanket deference is problematic as a matter of equality. The sensitivity of the abortion question is not a sufficient justification for judicial restraint. In light of the discriminatory nature of the policies in dispute, as well as the presence of an established principle that operates to narrow state discretion (consensus),
A. INTRODUCTION
In Ireland, abortion is almost completely illegal. Constitutional protection for unborn life limits the availability of abortion to circumstances where there is a direct threat to the life of a pregnant woman. 1 The termination of pregnancy in any other circumstance is a criminal offence, 2 and thus most women who seek a safe and legal abortion must leave the country. In 2005, three Irish women who had previously travelled to the UK for abortions challenged these restrictions before the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter "the Court"), asserting that Ireland had breached Articles 2, 3, 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter "the Convention") on the right to life, the right to be free from inhuman treatment, the right to privacy and the right to non-discrimination respectively. Their application was heard before the Grand Chamber of 17 judges on December 9, 2009. The third applicant, C, was successful in her claim that her rights under article 8 of the Convention, including her right to physical integrity, were violated by the lack of an accessible procedure through which she could have established her qualification for a lawful abortion. 3 This ruling led to the adoption of the "The Protection of Life during Pregnancy Act 2013"the first piece of legislation in Ireland to define the circumstances and processes within which abortion can be legally performed. While this certainly represents a welcome step forward for those seeking to liberalise abortion laws in Ireland, the situation for most women who seek access to abortions has in no way changed.
This includes applicants A and B, whose right to an abortion when their health and wellbeing are at risk was denied by the European Court. Though the Court found that there had been an interference with the applicants' right to private life, "owing to the acute sensitivity of the moral and ethical issues raised by abortion" 4 Ireland was afforded a wide margin of appreciation and was not found to have breached the Convention. This paper takes the position that such judicial deference is an unsound response to the violation of women's reproductive freedom and a particularly problematic answer to emerge from an international human rights court. In the context of abortion rights, the practice of international and regional human rights bodies is central to protection and indeed to reform. As the case of C illuminates, where the applicant had to turn to the Court to find a means of accessing her preexisting rights under domestic law, women and advocates rely on the international framework as the last available forum to circumvent resistant governments and political inertia in their home states. Yet, the case of ABC is indicative of how far the Court is willing to go in this regard. The majority decision to dismiss the claims of A and B rests decidedly with a wide application of the margin of appreciation, and this paper will conclusively demonstrate that this application of the margin was disproportionate.
The critique is based on two distinct points. Firstly, the Court's application of the margin of appreciation in ABC is flawed as a matter of legal method. In its attempt to disengage itself from the abortion question, the Court disregards well-established methodology of Strasbourg jurisprudence that should have served to strengthen the Court's power of review. In particular, the existence of 'consensus' throughout Europe on permitting abortions where a woman's health and wellbeing are at risk, should have contracted the power of discretion afforded to national authorities. Secondly, the blanket deference in ABC is problematic as a matter of equality. The regulation of abortion results in a gendered hierarchy of state protection for human rights, and legal policies that prescribe unequal treatment demand strict scrutiny. This is particularly true in the ECtHR context, as the Court has in the past proclaimed gender equality as one of the key underlying principles of the Convention system. 5 It will be argued that wide-ranging deference on policies that raise questions of equality cannot be reconciled with this goal. Part B of this paper will provide an overview of the judicial approach in ABC and will offer a background on the operation of the margin of appreciation doctrine in ECHR jurisprudence. Part C consists of the first critique as to why the margin of appreciation in ABC is disproportionate. It illustrates that in affording Ireland a wide margin of appreciation, the Court disregards the long established Strasbourg methodology of 'consensus.' It makes clear that the novelty of the Court's approach is indicative of a judicial desire to defer to the national position on abortion. In Part D, the paper demonstrates the implications of abortion policy on gender equality. It then analyses how the Court's application of the margin of appreciation in ABC reproduces this inequality by devaluing women's rights, dismissing the gendered impact of abortion policies and by endorsing a discriminatory policy of requiring women to go abroad to access human rights. In Part E, it concludes that the Court's approach in ABC amounts to a reduction of its own institutional competence, as well as its mandate to uphold equality and to protect the rights of women.
B. BACKGROUND
The three applicants in ABC complained to the European Court that the restrictions on the availability of abortion in Ireland forced them to leave the country to access their reproductive freedoma process which was expensive, dangerous, and traumatic. The first applicant, A, was a recovering alcoholic with four children in the care of the state. At risk of post-natal depression (which she had suffered after each of her four prior pregnancies) and of the view that a fifth child may impede her progress in becoming sober and reuniting with her family, she travelled to the UK in secret to obtain an abortion. The second applicant, B, was young, poor and felt that she could not care for a child on her own. She also travelled to the UK in secret. The third applicant, C, who was in remission from cancer, struggled to obtain information from medical practitioners as to the impact of her pregnancy on her health and life. Having researched the risks herself, she decided to travel to the UK for an abortion.
Upon return to Ireland, she suffered prolonged bleeding and infection as consequences of an incomplete abortion, but experienced difficulty in accessing satisfactory medical care. The applicants argued that Irish abortion law subjected them to degrading treatment and risked their health. The third applicant also contended that her life had been placed at risk. In its 2010 judgement, the Grand Chamber determined that there was no violation of Article 2, as there existed no legal impediment to the applicants' travelling abroad for an abortion. Although the third applicant had suffered post-abortion complications, the Court felt that there was no evidence of any relevant risk to her life. 6 Regarding Article 3, the Court took the view that travelling abroad for an abortion was both psychologically and physically arduous for each of the applicants, and financially burdensome for the first applicant. 7 However, in the Court's opinion, this did not reach the minimum level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3. 8 The heart of the Grand Chamber's judgment addressed the violations of privacy and family life under Article 8. The Court found in favour of the third applicant, 9 reiterating its previous position that, where abortion is legally permitted, the state has a positive obligation to ensure that it is accessible. 10 The Court was adamant that Article 8 could not be interpreted as conferring a right to an abortion, 11 but with respect to applicants A and B it accepted that the Irish prohibition on abortion for reasons of maternal welfare came within the scope of the applicants' right to respect for their private lives under Article 8(1). 12 However, it was judged that the prohibition amounted to an interference with that right, which was in accordance with the law, and pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of morals. Here the Court accepted the normative premise of abortion restrictions in Ireland as being "the profound moral views" of the Irish people, which demanded strong protection for pre-natal life. 13 Yet, as required by Article 8(2), the proportionality of this interference had to be reviewed. To assess whether the prohibition on abortion was necessary in a democratic society, the Court considered whether "struck a fair balance between, on the one hand, the first and second applicants' right   to respect for their private lives under Article 8 and, on the other, the profound moral   values of the Irish people as to the nature of life, and consequently as to the need to   protect the life of the unborn." 14 Significantly, in determining whether this balance was met, the Court afforded the Irish government a wide margin of appreciation. The Court reasoned that the Irish government's "direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their country" enabled them to ascertain the content and requirements of national morals and the necessity of the restrictions. 15 The claims of applicants A and B were dismissed. It was observed that the prohibition on abortion for the protection of a woman's health and wellbeing came within Ireland's margin of appreciation and, accordingly, Ireland's abortion restrictions did not violate the Convention.
Given that the decision not to recognise the claims of applicants A and B centres upon the majority's use of the margin of appreciation, it is useful at this point to consider the origins and operation of the doctrine under the Convention system. Defined as the line at which "international supervision should give way to a State Party's discretion in enacting or enforcing its laws", 16 the margin of appreciation operates to reduce the level of scrutiny the Court applies to laws that interfere with an individual's rights. This typically occurs when the Court is dealing with matters "of general policy, on which opinions within a democratic society may reasonably differ". 17 In such circumstances, the role of the domestic policymaker is given weight and, accordingly, the Member State may be considered "better suited to settle the dispute". 18 The doctrine was initially developed to address fear amongst Member States that European human rights policies could weaken national security. 19 The Court awarded states a measure of discretion in assessing the proportionality of Article 15 emergency measures, and their compatibility with the Convention. 20 This deferential approach gradually evolved beyond security considerations and was applied to deal with issues such as language policies in education, 21 the allocation of natural resources, 22 and the imposition of free speech limitations to protect public morals. 23 Benvenisti notes that this extension reflected a new philosophy within the Court: a philosophy grounded in notions of subsidiarity and democracy. 24 That is, the Court recognised that primary responsibility for protecting human rights lies with Member States and that, in order for them to guarantee such protection, national authorities must consider local needs and conditions.
In modern jurisprudence the doctrine receives its greatest expression in determining the scope of the "personal freedoms" 25 of the Convention (Articles 8-11), whereby states are expressly allowed to limit rights if "necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." 26 The Court has recognised that there exists a great diversity of values throughout the Member States of the Council of Europe, and that this pluralism must be respected. 27 By deferring to the national authorities, the margin is seen as embracing cultural diversity and incorporating societal differences into the Convention scheme of rights. 28 Thus, where a case raises sensitive or moral issues, the Court is more likely to afford a wide margin of appreciation and find that there has been no breach of the Convention. As emphasised in X, Y and Z v the United Kingdom, this approach will be taken where there is no consensus among the Member States of the Council of Europe, "either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it." 29 The extent to which the margin of appreciation reduces the intensity of the European Court's review of rights violations can lead to concern. Letsas argues that the margin of appreciation can be deployed by the Court to avoid substantive human rights review 21 altogether. 30 Where the Court waives its power of review completely, it is no longer just a margin that is afforded to public authorities, but substantive interpretive control. 31 The danger here is that, if applied in this way, the margin of appreciation can relegate rights adjudication to domestic relativism. Immune from external review, states can become free to adopt policies that may prescribe a lower level of human rights protection than the Convention would otherwise impose.
This danger is realised in ABC. The margin of appreciation is invoked under the guise of protecting moral diversity on the sensitive question of abortion. Yet despite being championed as a means of ensuring respect for ethical diversity, the margin in ABC operates as a strategy of evasion for the majority. Though the Court found that there had been a violation of the applicants' right to a private life, it proceeded to afford a wide margin of appreciation to Ireland, practically deferring to Ireland's position. Significantly, this approach is disproportionate on the basis of the Court's own principles regarding the margin of appreciation. Furthermore, it is unsound as a response from the European Court to the violation of reproductive freedoman issue that is inextricably linked to gender equality.
These arguments will be presented in turn.
C. THE DISPROPORTIONATE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN ABC
The Court's application of the margin of appreciation was disproportionate on two main grounds. Firstly, the width of the margin should have been contracted in accordance with the long-standing methodology of European consensus. Additionally, the impetus behind the Court's dubious legal reasoning is to avoid losing recourse to the margin of appreciation and to maintain its deferential approach on the subject of abortion. Secondly, blanket deference to the status quo is unjustified in abortion cases as, in this case, state regulation on abortion perpetuates inequality. Furthermore, though the Grand Chamber rigorously attempts to disengage itself from the conflict, its strategy of restraint serves to reinforce a gendered system of inequality.
A Departure from Long Standing Methodology of the European Court
The Court deemed that a measure of deference was appropriate in ABC, owing to "the acute 
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however that, with respect to well-known principles of the Court's jurisprudence, the margin of appreciation is narrower in cases where either an important facet of an individual's identity is at stake, or a consensus among the Council of Europe Member States exists. 33 The first of these contracting mechanisms reflects the fact that, where state policy impacts on an individual's identity, the state may be infringing a person's most intimate, inalienable rights.
This paper will first analyse the Court's decision to overlook the relevance of European consensus on providing abortion access to women whose health and wellbeing is at risk. It will then go on to examine the Court's failure to address the impact of abortion restrictions on an individual's identity, in section D.
The existence of "consensus", as used by the Court, refers to the identification of a minimum standard or discernible trend among Council of Europe members on a matter "touching upon a human right." 34 Specifically, the Court looks to the law and practice of European states for a common trend, where a matter or interest is not enumerated in the Convention, or is perceived as being beyond the contemplation of the drafters. 35 Where consensus is established, the Court will generally find that the interest in question is within the scope of the Convention's protection. It is generally used as a basis for the evolution of Convention norms and aids the Court in its goal of ensuring the harmonious enforcement of human rights protection throughout Europe. 36 Accordingly, the existence of a European consensus decisively narrows a state's margin of appreciation in deciding whether or not to protect a certain freedom. In other words, where a respondent state is shown to be out of step with European consensus, the Court will normally find a breach in rights protection.
In ABC, the Court went to surprising lengths to avoid such an outcome. The Court confirmed that there was a consensus amongst the majority of European states towards more liberal abortion policies than those that existed in Ireland. 37 where it is necessary for the protection of maternal health and wellbeing. 38 A more restrictive regime than Ireland's exists in just three states, in that it does not explicitly permit abortion on any grounds, even where the woman's life is at risk. 39 Thus, the first applicant was entitled to a lawful abortion in 40 of the 47 states, and the second applicant could have obtained an abortion legally in 35 states. This demonstrated that in balancing the health and wellbeing of the mother with the rights of the foetus, the European majority view definitively gave precedence to the former. In short, a European standard exists to afford more value to the health and wellbeing of the mother over the interests of the foetus.
However, the Court held that this consensus towards liberalising abortion laws to encompass protection for a woman's health and wellbeing, did not narrow Ireland's margin of appreciation. 40 Instead, the Court held that the task of weighing the mother's rights with the rights of the foetus could not be separated from the question of when life beginsa question on which there was no consensus in Europe, and on which states enjoyed a wide margin (as ruled in Vo v France). 41 Accordingly, the Court decided that the margin afforded in respect of the protection of unborn life "necessarily translate[d]" into the margin that states have in balancing the rights of the mother and the unborn. 42
A Margin and Consensus that "do not toe the line" 43
There are two main problems with this assessment. Firstly, as the dissenting judges pointed out, the majority was wrong to conflate the issues of protection for maternal health and the protection for unborn life. 44 The margin that was afforded in Vo concerned the question of whether or not to protect unborn life. That is, the Court held that a margin of appreciation should be allowed to each state to determine whether a foetus has a right to life. Ireland thus had a margin in its determination that the protection of pre-natal life was a vital interest of the country. Yet, Ireland was not deprived of its initial choice to protect the unborn by being required to balance this interest with the competing interests of the rights of the mother. 45 Judge Finlay Geoghegan also recognised that the transfer of the margin on the protection of 38 unborn life to the margin that states have in balancing the rights of the mother and the unborn was erroneous. The judge noted that, for "the consensus to be relevant, it should be a consensus on the balance to be struck between the potentially competing interests of the rights of woman and the unborn." 46 It follows that the Court's reasoning was somewhat circular, in that the majority believed that Ireland's margin of appreciation could not be narrowed by consensus, because of the fact that Ireland already had a margin. As I have highlighted earlier though, the margin of appreciation afforded concerned a different issue.
It is interesting to note that, in Ireland v UK, 47 the Court could arguably be said to have conflated the margin of appreciation on the question of whether a threat to the life of the nation existed, with the margin on the question of whether the measures used to address this threat were "strictly required by the exigencies" of the situation. 48 However, in recent times the Court has cast off its reticence in scrutinising the proportionality of derogation measures, as evidenced by the Court's decision in A & Ors. 49 In other words, the margin that is afforded to states in deciding that there is a need to protect the life of their nation no longer translates into a margin on whether the resulting derogations are proportionate. In this vein, the margin afforded to Ireland in protecting pre-natal life should not have been reassigned to the question of whether a fair balance had been struck between the rights of the mother and those of the unborn.
The second problem is the motivation behind the first. That is, the Court's justification for affording Ireland a wide margin to the state was premised on the "profound moral views" of the Irish people. 50 As De Londras and Dzehtsiarou describe, the Court ruled that the "internal moral consensus" in Ireland "trumped" European consensus. 51 Thus, the Court justified Ireland's failure to protect the applicants' rights in accordance with European standards, based on the fact that the dominant ideology in Ireland did not agree with the value 46 ABC (n 3), Concurring Opinion of Judge Finlay Geoghegan, para 8. 47 Ireland v UK, App no 5310/71 (18 January 1978 54 Strictly speaking, by enabling one country to deviate from the European standard of rights protection on the basis of relative values, the Court compromises its role in maintaining "minimum standards for rights protection." 55 Yet before we consider the consequences of this deviation, it is worth underlining the novelty in this approach.
The dissenting opinion in ABC emphasised that this case marks the first time that European consensus was discounted on the basis of moral beliefs. 56 This begs the question: why was the majority in ABC willing to depart so significantly from the Court's own authority? Why, when the Court's own principles should have guided it towards upholding a minimum standard of protection for reproductive freedom, did it choose not to? It appears that the Court is "too ready to abandon the notion of consensus where the 52 It worth noting that the actual existence of an internal consensus on abortion in Ireland is questionable, and is rigorously contested by many commentators (see, to that effect, De Londras and Dzehtsiarou (n 51), 7). However, it must be conceded that the process of fact finding 'is not normally within the province of the European Court' (Klaas v Germany, App no 15473/89 (6 September 1978), para 29). In other words, it is not clear what resources the Court has at its disposal that would allow it to definitively discern the lack of a moral consensus in Ireland. 53 
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issue is too political to be decided by Strasbourg." 62 The disproportionate application of the margin speaks to a judicial desire to avoid a confrontation on an issue that is controversial and sensitive. The Court was determined to avoid contracting Ireland's discretion on abortion policy. These functional concerns in the use of the margin in ABC are compounded by the resulting issues raised in respect of gender equality.
D. DEFERENCE AND EQUALITY
Abortion restrictions perpetuate a standard of state protection for human rights that is unequal and gendered. Blanket deference, where the Court gives the ultimate power of assessment to the national authorities, can thereby "open a door of approval" 63 for states which adopt discriminatory abortion laws. Gender equality has been long marked out as one of the fundamental principles of human rights law. 64 The European Court of Human Rights itself has long asserted that the "advancement of the equality of the sexes" is an important goal of the Member States of the Council of Europe. 65 Furthermore, the Court has reiterated that gender equality is one of the "key principles underlying the Convention." 66 Yet there is a stark divergence between such aspirations and the deference shown in ABC. In this section,
the key link between abortion policies and gender equality will be established. This will underpin my critique of the Court's application of the margin of appreciation in ABC, and illustrate how the Court's judgment risks reproducing inequality.
The legal regulation of abortion prescribes the extent to which a pregnant woman's rights can be abridged. The pregnant woman's right to bodily integrity is invariably qualified, as both the state and medical practitioners assume significant control (at times even full control) over her pregnancy. As Rosemey Nisoff outlines, once a woman is pregnant, her rights are shared with the foetus she is supporting, with the state, and with her medical practitioners. 67 Her autonomy is thus reduced, especially where the regulatory framework qualifies abortion, as doctors and legislators become the primary decision makers of whether she can terminate her pregnancy, and in turn deprive her of the opportunity to pursue any other personally, rather than collectively, valued choices. The Irish example further illustrates that a woman's attempts to access her reproductive rights may be criminalised.
This inequality in the treatment of pregnant women is compounded by the fact that unintended pregnancy disproportionately affects low-income women and minorities 68those who already often find themselves victims of social and economic inequities. Abortion is often sought by women in circumstances of poverty, coercion and violence. 69 This is evidenced by the circumstances of the applicants in ABC and further highlighted, as the report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
shows, by the particular oppression caused by Ireland's abortion laws to asylum seekers and women with limited financial resources. 70 In addition, discrimination is perpetuated on socioeconomic grounds when abortion laws force women to travel long distances to access reproductive health services. 71 Crucially, the policies that qualify a woman's rights once she is pregnant represent a standard of state protection that rests solely on sex-specific grounds. That is, the rights of reached in the respective courts diverged significantly. The European Court's use of the margin of appreciation facilitated this finding.
As mentioned above, the majority in ABC stated that where a "particularly important facet of an individual existence or identity is at stake" 77 the margin of appreciation afforded to a state will be narrowed, yet the Court in ABC was not inclined to restrict national discretion on abortion. Thus, in order to ensure that Ireland's latitude of deference on the abortion question is not curtailed, the Grand Chamber curtails the breadth of the applicants'
Article 8 rights and in particular the protection of their "physical and social identity". The Nicollette Prialxu argues, the Court did not make clear that the deprivation of a lawful abortion was unjust. 85 The Court will uphold Article 8 claims only when they encroach on procedural aspects of the right rather than on the crux of self-determination or autonomy in reproductive decisions. 86 b) The failure to engage Article 3
All three applicants in ABC challenged Ireland's restrictive abortion regime under Article 3, namely on the ground that the impact of the restrictions on abortion and of travelling for an abortion abroad amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment. 90 The Court regarded this complaint as "manifestly ill-founded" 91 and quickly dispatched the evidence before it. While the majority did recognise that women endure "significant psychological burdens" in being required to leave their home country to seek medical treatment prohibited there, they ruled that this did not reach the threshold of Article 3. 92
This dismissal was an unsound outcome. It can be argued that the Court's refusal to recognise the Article 3 violations in the context of abortion is motivated by the absolute nature of the right in question and the limited opportunity of invoking the margin of appreciation in this regard. The Court has defined "degrading treatment" as that which is said to "arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority, capable of humiliating and debasing them." 93 In the case of ABC, substantial evidence was provided to demonstrate that the severity of Irish law and the resulting and pervasive stigma of abortion were an affront to women's dignity. 94 Irish women who seek abortions are given three choices by the state:
(i) they must overcome the trauma, taboo and financial difficulties of travelling abroad to do something which is illegal in their own country;
(ii) they must seek unsafe back-street abortions for which they may be imprisoned; or 88 P and S v Poland App no 57375/08 (ECtHR 30 October 2012). 89 ibid paras 97-98. 90 ABC (n 3), para 160. 91 ABC (n 3), para 165. 92 ABC (n 3), paras 239-241. 93 Ireland v UK (n 47), para 167. 94 ABC (n 3), submission from Doctors for Choice, paras 120-131.
(iii) they must maintain their pregnancieseven where this places their health and wellbeing at risk.
Debasing feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority are consistent outcomes for each course of action.
Restrictive abortion laws further impact on dignity, as they perpetuate a pervasive stigma. This in turn threatens respect for the equal worth of all individuals. 95 The principal mechanism by which stigmatisation violates dignity is the corrosion of individual self-respect and self-worth. 96 It also includes a loss in social hierarchy and is multidimensional, so that it has socio-political effects. The stigma created by restrictive abortion laws induces a "chilling" climate of fear and shame that impacts on both those who seek abortion services and those who carry out the procedure. 97 Women may be penalised for seeking access to necessary healthcare, which can cause deep humiliation, fear and even violence. Thus, the need to seek illegal health services and the intense stigmatisation of both the abortion procedure and the women who seek such procedures can have deleterious effects on women's mental health. In addition, as the United Nations Special Rapporteur concluded in 2011, restrictive abortion laws produce a chilling effect, which may prevent healthcare workers from seeking training and information on abortion. 98 Healthcare workers who choose to perform abortions under these circumstances may accordingly be uninformed and untrained on appropriate abortion procedure and post-abortion care, reducing the quality and availability of legal abortions. Furthermore, the criminalisation of abortion creates a vicious cycle; as the United Nations Special Rapporteur investigated "...the stigma resulting from procuring an illegal abortion perpetuates the notion that abortion is an immoral practice, which then reinforces the continued criminalization of the practice." 99 Even for women who can afford to travel and who can navigate the logistics of obtaining an abortion abroad, the emotional burdens involved are profound. 100 from recognising the inhuman and degrading treatment experienced by women who are denied access to an abortion.
The Dismissal of Gender
By focusing purely on abortion as a matter of morality, the Court disregards the discriminatory impact of abortion. As Blanca Rodriguez-Ruiz demonstrates, the gender dimension of abortion restrictions is eclipsed by metalegal and metaphysical arguments. 112 As noted earlier, regardless of a person's stance on abortion, it cannot be contested that to endorse a policy of sending women abroad to access their human rights.
Overt Endorsement of Discrimination -Sending Women Abroad to Access Human

Rights
Though the Court was adamant that the Irish Government was to benefit from a wide power of appreciation, it was necessary to examine whether the interference with the applicants' rights was "necessary in a democratic society". This involved an assessment of whether denying women access to abortioneven where maternal health and wellbeing are under threatis proportionate to the aim of protecting Irish morals. 115 she needs. The judgment suggests that it is within a state's margin of appreciation to treat its citizens unequally on a moral basis. This is compounded by the fact that travelling overseas may not be an option for many, a consideration wholly absent from the Court's opinion. For unemployed women or women earning low wages, the freedom to travel is illusory. In 2013, Human Rights Watch identified the cost of an early medical abortion in the UK at £535 (€670) and £800 (€1000) for an abortion preformed in late gestation. 121 These sums are not inclusive of other costs that are likely to be incurred, such as travel and accommodation, childcare, loss of income and the costs of a travelling companion. Human Rights Watch outline that the total cost of an abortion could exceed an individual's monthly salary. 122 For many women, this barrier will be insurmountable. 123 Additionally, for refugee women in Ireland, the constitutional freedom to travel does not exist. Lacking the time and money to obtain passports, they must apply to the Department of Justice for travel documents to leave the country. The Department has no policy to address these situations and therefore decides on an ad hoc basis. Secondly, the cost of obtaining an abortion abroad is likely to be out of reach, as asylum seekers do not have the right to work in Ireland. Instead they are in receipt of "direct provision" from the Irish Government, which amounts to €19.10 a week. 124 An additional cost may be incurred, as it is necessary for all non-EU nationals in Ireland to apply and pay for visas to enter the UK, or Schengen visas to enter into a European Union (EU) country. The position of women under 18 is equally difficult. In 2007, a 17-year-old girl in the care of the state and carrying a foetus with a fatal abnormality was forced to initiate proceedings in the High Court in order to claim her right to travel for an abortion. 125 In light of the tangible barriers to travel, it would seem inappropriate to suggest that an 'option' of travel can negate a breach of the Convention.
Sheelagh McGuinness highlights that the Grand Chamber has since followed the ABC approach of including the availability of cross-border treatment in its assessment of proportionality. 126 In SH & Ors v Austria 127 the Court opined that Austria provided adequate respect for the applicants' right to privacy as the State did not prohibit people from travelling abroad to avail of assisted procreation techniques that are proscribed in Austria. However, it was also relevant that, upon return, Austrian law would respect the wishes of the parents regarding paternity and maternity. 128 This 'tolerance'a principle that has been marked out as critical to the assessment of whether a restriction on a right is "necessary in a democratic society" 129cannot be said to be present in ABC. As detailed, Irish women who travel abroad for abortions face an unrelenting stigma upon return. Additionally, the availability of postabortion care is limited.
E. CONCLUSION
Marie Dembour has remarked: "[w]hen it comes to illustrating the way in which human rights law at Strasburg fails to address women's predicament in a male-dominant society, abortion is an excellent case in point." 130 A, B & C v Ireland is the case that validates her condemnation of the European Court of Human Rights. Demarcated as unequal citizens, the women in ABC turned to the judicial process to vindicate their rights and seek equal protection. Some argue that the Court is not there to perform miracles on behalf of reluctant legislatures. 131 This claim may be particularly applicable to an international court which oversees a system of rights protection dependent on the subsidiary protection of contracting states. Crucially, however, in ABC the European Court represented an institution that was both legitimate and institutionally competent to address the violation of women's reproductive freedom. In the first instance, it has been shown the Court had the competence to define the minimum standard of protection for women's reproductive freedom owing to the presence of European consensus. Secondly, by the Court's own admission, the principle of gender equality underpins both the European Convention and human rights. The Court was thus mandated to scrutinise the regulations that afford an unequal standard of protection to women's rights and that place access to equality beyond the reach of many women. However, through its reliance on the margin of appreciation, the majority in ABC bypasses the violations and inequality before it. In doing so, the Court shrinks from its obligations as an international human rights adjudicator. That is, by departing from its established methodology and acquiescing to the position of the national authorities, the Court eludes its role in determining the minimum standards of the Convention, and fails to safeguard against a gendered hierarchy of rights protection.
This article has shown that the application of the margin of appreciation in the majority decision of A, B & C v Ireland is disproportionate on two main grounds. Firstly, although there exists clear consensus throughout the Council of Europe regarding situations where the rights of the mother should outweigh those of the foetus (i.e. risk to health, wellbeing), the Court deemed this inapplicable. Instead, the Court endorses Irish exceptionalism on abortion as an "internal consensus" that can prevail upon European standards. Secondly, the Court's reliance on the margin of appreciation to defer to the national authorities results in the Court backtracking on foundational principles of its human rights jurisprudence. This paper outlined that abortion cases demand a heightened standard of judicial scrutiny in order to accord equal value to women's lives and their rights. By contrast, the European Court defers to the status quo, fails to address the feelings of debasement, as well as the discrimination caused by Ireland's abortion regime and, thus, ultimately devalues women's rights. While the Court attempts to portray the margin as a means of respecting domestic morals and cultural values, this disguise is thinly veiled. The margin of appreciation is applied as a tool of evasion, yet these judicial politics amount to a disproportionate response to the violation of women's reproductive freedom in ABC.
